S19: Conclusion

• Tong Ying-kit is a 24-year-old resident of Hong Kong.
• First person to be prosecuted under Hong Kong’s National Security Law.
• Tong Ying-kit was arrested on July 1, 2020, for allegedly driving his motorcycle into a group of police officers while flying a black flag with the words “Liberate Hong Kong Revolution of Our Times” written in white.
• The incident occurred during a demonstration against the new National Security Law.

Urbanization as China’s growth engine

• Growth in urban labor market: From 200 million in 1996 to 400 million in 2015

Rural-urban gap

• Market reforms initially shrank the gap, but ultimately contributed to inequality by accelerating urban growth.
• Income inequality in China largely spatial and structural in nature

Political utility:

• Curb rural-to-urban migration
• Reduce costs of social goods provision
• Extract agricultural surplus
• Enforce policy goals (one-child policy, etc.)

Side effects:

• Distortions in population settlement
• Income disparities
• Labor market distortion
• Social tensions and disparities due to unequal access

Resistance to reform:

• Increased migration would make major cities even more crowded and unmanageable
• Increased labor inflows would depress urban residents’ wages
• Cities, without more revenues, would struggle to serve new residents

1994: Tax reform

Goal:

• Centralization of tax revenue at central gov

Side effects:

• Local gov given new power to appropriate land
• Local gov underfunded; Public goods provisions suffered

2006: Abolition of agricultural tax

Goal:

• Improve rural livelihoods and tackle urban-rural inequality

Side effects:

• Dependence on land development for local revenue
• Land disputes: Increased reclamation from farmers and leasing of land-use rights to industrial and commercial developers
• “Ghost towns”: Product of local fiscal and budgetary incentives, rather than consumer demands
• Creation of “landless peasants” and increased migration to cities
• Contentious politics: Without social security, uptick in social insurance disputes and collective action

Early reform era

• Social instability as a result of economic liberalization
  • Layoff from state-owned firms: 50 million workers, 40% of public enterprise workforce
  • Urban unemployment from return of sent-down youth
  • Influx of migrant workers into cities
• Welfare system to solve urban poverty and reduce social conflict

Late 2010s

• Economic growth as way of preserving social stability
  • Economic performance tied to bureaucratic career advancement
• Stability as absolute principle: Widening stability maintenance regime
  • Avoiding large-scale mobilization as target for political performance
  • Responsibility for stability expanded to broad array of public institutions
• Welfare program to prioritize destitute and sensitive individuals and pre-empt disorder

Many goals:

• Labor mobility
• Decreased segmentation of labor markets
• Enhance economic productivity
• Reduction of social conflicts over workplace rights and rural land rights
• Continued urbanization (and economic growth): Majority of China’s population urbanized by 2050

And many moving pieces (and conflicting interests):

• Hukou system
• Fiscal policies
• Redistribution policies
• Demographic changes
• Geopolitical tensions

• After SARS in 2003, self-critical report: health care system “basically unsuccessful”
• Proposals solicited in 2007 from National Development and Reform Commission, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and McKinsey
• New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme, urban resident health insurance and Medical Assistance Program

• Provision of social services to workers, families: Job and life skills training, medical check-ups, cultural activities, and legal education
• Organizing, orchestrating, and coaching collective action

Civil society I:

• apolitical organizations improving the quality of governance and enhancing political stability
• Economic, social, cultural, and non-critical , largely limited to charitable and social welfare activities
• Gray organizations: not formally registered but in collaboration with local officials to provide public goods and services
• 800,000 NGOs, 1.5 million unregistered but still active
• Under Xi: declining small and unregistered organizations, replaced with larger and more official institutions

Civil Society II:

• Political and critical
• Small but invisible, especially under Xi Jinping
• New Citizens Movement: Human rights lawyer
• No real political opposition, few dissidents, little support

Local officials:

• Lack of fiscal resources from higher level gov
• Need to rely on land sales / local businesses for revenue
• Economic growth AND political stability as criteria for career advancement
• More responsive to central signals than to local concerns

Central government

• Frequency of protests drain on energy and resources: More spending on domestic security than social
• At the same time, protest useful for pressure release and political feedback – costly, but still preferable to alternatives (democratization)
• Vested interests prevented response to structural factors of corruption – i.e., excessive role of party-state
• Difficult equilibrium of political liberalization: How to meet popular demands AND stay within the party system?

• CCP: single party-state, but not a unified actor
• Vertical fragmentation:
  • Principal agent problem: Top decisions not always implemented at the bottom
  • Conflict of interests: Different levels of political system have different priorities
• Horizontal fragmentation
  • At each level, different agencies and ministries had different policy preferences.
  • Incomplete and compartmentalized information
  • Unclear authority
• New policy entrepreneurs: journalists, activists, experts, NGOs

• Mandate after “ten lost years” under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao: widening inequality, ethnic uprising, pronounced dissent, health crisis, environmental degradation
• Stalled reforms: Accumulation of personal power necessary for restructuring China
• Rise of Xi as response to drift under collective leadership
• Reliance on authoritarian measures and personal power as source of discord and instability

China after Xi:

• Despite institutionalization since Deng, unresolved succession crisis
• Political patronage and factionalism

Deep historical roots:

• “Core leader”: Orderly transition for weak leaders
• Search for unity: One state, one party, one leader
• Elite unity: Commitment to one-party rule
• Red vs. expert: Political loyalty and professional expertise
• Leninist party-state as source of resilience

In search of a new growth model:

• Middle income trap
• Demographic challenges

Historical roots:

• Product of own policies
• Debate about relationship between party and market, between economic growth and political stability

• Employment at Dartmouth: Oct 1921 - Jul 1943
• No bachelor’s degree; 20 years in China as English teacher in China (1901-1921)
• Monograph: “A Complete English Grammar for Chinese Students” (1923)
• Self-taught Chinese language and culture
• Reference by Herbert Hoover

History of China and Japan to 1894

The course is introduced by lectures on the geography and ethnography of Eastern Asia.

The social and economic transformation of China in our time

The course begins with a brief outline of Chinese history, followed by a survey of Chinese institutions as they were before they began to be greatly affected by Occidental influences.

The Far East

A survey of the far eastern situation in its political, economic, and social aspects. The recent development and present problems of the Chinese and Japanese peoples will be given careful consideration.

• From sinology to area studies: “Who Lost China”
• Totalitarian model: Focus on institutions, leaders, ideology
• Opening after Mao: Learning from each other
• New topics became researchable with new research methods
• More nuanced and highly variegated image of China: complexity and diversity, rather than uniformity

When we have found ways to work together, the world has been changed for the better; and when we have been at odds, needless tension and suffering were the result. In both our societies there are voices of those who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation. We both must take bold measures to overcome these negative forces.

Toast by the Honorable Brent Scowcroft Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Beijing, December 9, 1989

We are not China’s prime enemy or threat, as some would claim. But, like you, we are true to our own values, our heritage and traditions. We can be no other way. We extend our hand in friendship, and hope you will do the same.

Toast by the Honorable Brent Scowcroft Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Beijing, December 9, 1989