S17: Contentious Politics

• Li Zhi (1978-), a Chinese folk singer, rose to fame with his rootsy ballads exploring his “small town” identity.
• Inspired by Pink Floyd and Luo Dayou.
• Known for his subversive songs, Li has been cancelled in China since 2019.

• Does the Chinese party-state inadvertently facilitate – rather than merely suppress – popular contention? How?
• What tactics do petitioners adopt and why? What can their dynamics tell us how politics work in contemporary China?
• Can protests strengthen – instead of weaken – state capacity? If so, how?

Economic reform:

• State-owned sector restructuring, fiscal recentralization, etc.
• Performance legitimacy

Inclusion of stake-holders:

• “Three Represents” (admitting private entrepreneurs into CCP)
• “Socialist harmonious society” and “Common Prosperity” (redistributive policies for “losers” of reform)

• Has institutionalization ended under Xi?
• Will the CCP regime remain a resilient autocracy?
• How accurate are our readings, given Xi’s increasing control of information about China?

Rupture

• End of formal rules and informal norms since Deng years
• 2018: National People’s Congress removed from constitution term limit for president and vice president
• 2023: Xi Jinping begins third term

Continuity:

• Limits of collective leadership: Strong man politics of Deng Xiaoping
• Factionalism: Political patronage and network
• “Core leader” as political culture

• While Xi Jinping has weakened some aspects of institutionalization, he has not completely dismantled these structures.
• The CCP has a “high-capacity bureaucracy” that remains crucial for governance, but Xi’s personalist rule poses risks, particularly concerning succession and policy decisions (p. 88).
• Main concern: succession after Xi and the potential for instability in the absence of established norms (p. 87)

“The average per-capita annual income in China is 30,000 yuan (USD 4,193), but there are over 600 million people whose monthly income is barely 1,000 yuan (USD 140), not enough to rent a room in the Chinese cities”.

Bigger pie for everyone:

• 7-8% growth in GDP per capita for 40 years
• Greatest poverty alleviation in human history: number of people below International Poverty Line fallen by close to 800 million

But increasingly unequal share:

• Li Keqiang (2020): 600 million (40% of population) with $140 monthly income
• Widening gap between 1) coastal and inland provinces; 2) urban and rural areas

Urbanization as China’s growth engine

• Growth in urban labor market: From 200 million in 1996 to 400 million in 2015

Rural-urban gap

• Market reforms initially shrank the gap, but ultimately contributed to inequality by accelerating urban growth.
• Income inequality in China largely spatial and structural in nature

• Pollution
• Growing inequalities
• Corruption
• Ideological contradictions

• Low-cost, low-skill, low-tech manufacturing employing an exploited migratory workforce
• Segmentation of labor market: Urban workers (with security through employment) vs. Rural migrant workers (without)
• Partial and differential citizenship: Abrogation of rural citizens’ land-use rights + Social discrimination and mistreatment of rural citizens in cities

Tian’anmen:

• Large-scale mass movement invovling people of all ages and walks of life
• Focus on broad social, political, economic issues
• Target national party and gov leaders

Post-Tian’anmen:

• More frequent but smaller in size
• Focused on local issues
• Concession with repression

• Protests due to limited outlet, limited consultative process; collective action seen as the only way to express grievances
• Increased frequency: 180,000 “collective action” incidents in 2010

• Income disparities
• Labor disputes, especially involving migrant factory workers
• Conflicts over use of land and other assets
• Environmental degradation

Scenario:

• Officials sold land to real estate developers without properly compensating the villagers.
• Several hundred to several thousand people protested in front of and then attacked a government building, a police station and an industrial park.

Role:

• Village association
• Wukan municipal party secretary
• Local real estate developer
• Taiwanese investors of industrial park
• Guangdong provincial party secretary
• CCP Central Politburo

• Why did protests become routinized in China?
• What are “political oppportunity structures”? How did the party-state tolerate – and even facilitate – contentious politics?
• When would you deploy “trouble making tactics”? What are the strategies for negotiation?

• Highly publicized protests over disputed village land sales to developers
• Appeals to higher provincial officials led to election of local officials
• Hailed as experiment of grassroots democracy
• Local elections suppressed in 2016

From official channels to unauthorized actions

• Writing and signing petitions
• Filing lawsuits
• Strikes and sit-ins
• Street protests

Framing protests: “Rightful resistance”

• Moral claims for justice and fairness
• Defending rights already promised by CCP
• Material interests and life quality (especially for environmental interests)

Repression with concession:

• Protests useful as signal to adjust policies, but reprisals and repression often needed to establish limits of protests

Incentive for escalation:

• Force begets more violent collective actions; concessions encouraged more protests to extract more from system

Early reform era

• Social instability as a result of economic liberalization
• Layoff from state-owned firms: 50 million workers, 40% of public enterprise workforce
• Urban unemployment from return of sent-down youth
• Influx of migrant workers into cities
• Welfare system to solve urban poverty and reduce social conflict

Late 2010s

• Economic growth as way of preserving social stability
• Avoiding large-scale mobilization as target for political performance
• Responsibility for stability expanded to broad array of public institutions
• Welfare program to prioritize destitute and sensitive individuals and pre-empt disorder

• Explain the main three theories for explaining contentious politics in China: Mobilizing Structure-Based, Grievance-based, Opportunity-structure based, State-centered. Which one do you find most convincing, and why?

• What is the letters and visits (xinfang) system? What is the “mass line”? How are they related?
• What tactics do petitioners adopt and why? What can their dynamics tell us how politics work in contemporary China?

• The Letters and Visits System (xinfang) is part of mass line politics and a form of nonbinding political consultation within an authoritarian system.
• Low success rate, but there needs to be flexibility in rules so that some petitions can reach the central power.
• Petitioners may use “troublemaking” tactics to stand out, as these are seen as more urgent and legitimate.

• Continuity between the current Party-state and Mao-era structures.
• Specifically, tensions exist in mass line politics between:
  • Bureaucratic specialization and power concentration.
  • Formal rules and procedural flexibility.
  • Local responsibilities and top-down control.
• These contradictions encourage popular protests, as most petitions fail to reach the central authority.

• Explain the film’s Chinese title, Tian Zhu Ding 天注定, which literally means “Heaven Decrees” or “Fate Decreed.” Are the events in the film predestined to happen?
• The film received mixed reviews, with some critics praising its realistic portrayal of society and others finding it disturbing or nihilistic. What do you think, especially regarding the depiction of violence and suicide?
• Is there a difference between criminal and evil? What is (in)justice?

• In October 2001, in Ujinshan Village, Jinzhong City, Shanxi Province, a large village with over 300 households and 1000 residents, a mass shooting occurred, resulting in the deaths of 9 people and injuries to 3 others.
• Driven by anger over failed coal contracts and sought revenge against village officials.
• Another narrative suggests Hu Filai was forced to kill in self-defense after being targeted for exposing corruption

• In 2004, Zhou Kehua robbed and killed a bank employee in Chongqing, taking 70,000 yuan.
• Over the new few years, he became a serial robber and murderer who targeted individuals and bank employees across multiple cities.
• In 2012, he was killed at the scene while trying to escape after robbing 25,000 yuan from a bank in Chongqing.

• In 2009, Hubei official demanded sexual services from Deng Yujiao, who refused and stabbed them, resulting in one death.
• Initially accused of murder, public outcry led to a not-guilty verdict due to a diagnosed mental condition.
• Deng Yujiao was widely praised as a heroine for resisting harassment.

• In 2010, there were 14 suicide jumps at Foxconn, a Taiwanese multinational electronics contract manufacturer. All jumpers were workers from 18 to 25 years old.
• Their suicides were believed to be the strict management and high pressure at the company.
• Some believe compensation policies may have also been a factor.