S16 - Authoritarian Resilience

• What led to the bloodshed of 1989? Was there a different path?
• From end of history to authoritarian resilience: How did the CCP survive the end of the Cold War?
• Debates about “China model”: What is socialism with Chinese characteristics?

• How does photography participate in the act of protest?
• Is there a visual language of dissent? If so, what does it look like?
• What role have images played in our collective memory of protest?

• Untitled, improvised, fluid in form
• Shaped by political culture and historical repertoire of collective action
• Familiar rituals offering a “script” for action

• Divided in strategy: Withdraw or escalate?
• Lack of organization
• Dwarfed by worker movement, alienated from peasantry
• Elitism vs. Mass participation: Who represents “the people”?
• Democracy: What does it mean? What do we want?

• Li Peng declares martial law.
• Deng Xiaoping announces replacement of Zhao Ziyang by Jiang Zemin as new general secretary.
• Zhao Ziyang makes final public appearance.
• PLA troops began entering the city in the evening.

You are still young and you have long lives ahead of you,” Zhao said into a megaphone: You should live healthily so that you can see the day when China achieves the Four Modernizations. You are not like us. We are old, it doesn’t matter [what happens to us] … You are teenagers or are in your twenties, are you really going to sacrifice your lives like this? Can’t you think a bit rationally?

• “Tiananmen Mothers” – victims’ parents who publicly came forward: 187 deaths
• Ministry of Public Security: 563 civilian deaths in Beijing, 11571 injuries (1990)
• Chinese Red Cross: 2600 deaths, 7000 injuries (1989)

The PLA had to fire back in self defense. At that time, the PLA had no equipment such as tear gas and riot shields. In retrospect, we think equipment of this nature is necessary and that lethal force and firearms should be used only in very critical and special circumstances. If we had had this equipment, casualties could have been less.

General Chi Haotian, 1990

• Zhao Ziyang had stayed in China
• The students had withdrawn earlier from the Square
• The leaders had been more patient and conciliatory
• The PLA had used non-lethal force
• etc.

Was there a counter-factual history?

• Explain Sun’s thesis and theoretical model of “Three-Way Succession” for explaining the outcome of Tian’anmen.

• How useful are the three models (Revolution Suppression, Two-Way Factionalism, and Three-Way Succession) in understanding other instances of political unrest beyond Tian’anmen? Does it overlook any factors, and why?

• Sun’s analysis focuses on Deng Xiaoping’s status as core leader. In his view, was Deng a reformer or a conservative? How do you reconcile his economic reforms with the military crackdown?

• Given that the models offer different interpretations of the same event, how can we determine which model provides the most accurate or insightful explanation? Is it possible to integrate elements from multiple models?

• Top leaders didn’t see the Tiananmen student movement as a threat to topple the regime.
• Instead, they used the protest to leverage their own political interests through “contentious labeling,” channeling the protest, and displaying military power.

• The decision to crackdown wasn’t based on a sense of threat but on the broader context of elite politics, especially the motivations of Deng Xiaoping and elite conflict regarding succession issues.
• The movement was influenced by the death of a dismissed secretary general, the precarious position of the current secretary general, a crossroads in Deng’s reform agenda, and the crisis it presented for Deng’s legacy.

• Chas W. Freeman Jr. is a retired American diplomat and writer.
• Served in the US Foreign Service, State and Defense Departments for thirty years.
• Notable positions include interpreter for Richard Nixon during his China visit and US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War.

• Who is Liu Xiaobo?
• What were his lessons learned from the 1989 protest movement?
• How did Liu’s views on Chinese politics evolve? What didn’t change?

• Sometimes a single photograph can have a far greater emotional impact than words alone could.
• The emotional potential makes photography a prime candidate for interpretation based on confirmation bias.
• “David and Goliath” or sign of restraint?

• Collective memory: Not a singular thing, but a practice and a process
• Formation: What narrative about the event should people remember?
• Mobilization: Bringing past memories to new collective actions
• Inter-generational memory and transmission
• Institutionalization: museums, monuments, textbooks, public holidays

• Banning of public commemoration in Hong Kong after National Security Law
• How to remember Tiananmen when 1) the space for collective memory diminishes; 2) collective identity shifts?

• Parallels: Taiwan’s 228 Incident, Korea’s Kwangju Uprising, and Indonesia’s 1965 Killings.
• Open discussions of these historical events were only made possible after regime changes.
• Meanwhile, memories survived in more virtualized, decentralized, individualized, and internationalized forms.

• Announced during Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” in Jan-Feb 1992
• Markets existed under both socialism and capitalism and therefore not subject to ideological tests
• 1992 party congress: creating a “socialist market economy” as reform objective

• Consolidation of market-oriented leaders
• Passing of old guards: Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, Hu Qiaomu

• Low-income: GDP per capita lower than large sub-Saharan Africa
• Human development level: Upper-middle-income economy
• Comprehensive economic infrastructure

• A country with abundant human resources, but bottled up in countryside
• (Misguided) capital intense development strategy: heavy industry

Tax reform: Broadening tax base

• Lower and more uniform rates
• Introduction of 17% value-added tax (VAT) and business tax

Recentralization: More revenue for central gov

• Central gov taking larger share than expenditure and redistributing surplus to local govs
• In exchange for fiscal contribution, new freedom for land development and investment
• Control of urban land into developmental resource

• Context: Asian Financial crisis in 1997
• “Safeguard the large firms, let go of the small firms”
• Massive layoffs: and widespread dissatisfaction

• Agreed in Nov 1999 and phasing in after 2001
• WTO membership as complementary to state-sector reforms: Linking up with global norms and regulations to lock in reform achievements
• Foundation for new age of growth: New, mixed corporate economy founded on substantial private ownership
• Global market as new source of demand and economic growth

The CCP represents:

• Advanced productive forces
• Orientation of China’s advanced cultures
• Fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people

Building a centralized system:

• Collective leadership
• Growing institutionalization: Politics contained within certain channels
• Term limit and peaceful transfer of power

New challenges:

• State of concession: presence of powerful leaders
• Source of dissatisfaction within party
• Difficulty in making tough decisions
• Consistent policy implementation
• Protection of corrupt followers by power brokers

Economic reform:

• State-owned sector restructuring, fiscal recentralization, etc.
• Performance legitimacy

Inclusion of stake-holders:

• “Three Represents” (admitting private entrepreneurs into CCP)
• “Socialist harmonious society” and “Common Prosperity” (redistributive policies for “losers” of reform)