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How the Qing Became China

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OF ALL THE WORLD'S GREAT EMPIRES, China alone kept its territory basically intact as the Qing Empire was transformed, in 1911, into the Republic of China and, in 1949, into the People's Republic. This was a remarkable achievement. At the turn of the twentieth century, China was regarded as the "sick man of Asia"; the European powers and Japan had repeatedly defeated China at war and claimed spheres of interest in its territory; global commentators were contemplating China's partition—a fate that the Chinese press routinely described as the "carving up of the melon." The same historical process that saw the Ottoman and Habsburg empires crumble in the late nineteenth century and collapse during World War I seemed to be affecting China. Russia, the other great contiguous empire of this age, also fell during the Great War, but managed a reconfiguration as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, keeping its peripheral ethnicities together in what some have called an "affirmative action empire."[1] Seventy years later, that transitional form disappeared, and the old Russian Empire has now been divided into nation-states. Thus, in the twenty-first century, China alone survives within its old imperial borders, Outer Mongolia and Taiwan notably excepted—a 14 percent loss in territory (mostly Mongolian steppe) but a mere 2 percent loss in population.

In nationalist historiography, China's achievement is unproblematic. To a point, the argument is persuasive. China has a long history of unified empire dating from the founding of the Qin dynasty in 221 BCE, and a common culture and traditions shared by many Chinese long before that time. Though Chinese spoke a variety of dialects, the literate classes had a common written language whose classical texts formed the basis for an examination system that

was the dominant route to official position from medieval times. As success in the imperially administered exams became the mark of elite status, the educational system was increasingly oriented toward the same classical texts, histories, and commentaries, yielding a remarkably uniform process of cultural and political socialization throughout the empire. With a strong centralized state and an elite whose status derived from participation in state-sponsored culture, there were few autonomous sources of local power and authority. China's main religious traditions, Buddhism and Daoism, were institutionally weak, and the ordination of clergy was controlled by the state. By late imperial times, as the homogenizing effects of elite culture trickled down to the general population, Chinese worshipped the same gods, performed the same family and community rituals, and donned similar styles of clothing and adornment, thus participating in a shared culture that made them "Chinese." Recognizing the cultural core of Chinese identity, much of the literature on modern Chinese nationalism describes a natural progression from Chinese "culturalism" to a new more politicized identification with the nation in the twentieth century.[2] In the comparative literature, China's legacy of shared (written) language, culture, and customs, together with its long history of centralized bureaucratic governance, has led some to classify China with the "historic nations" of Western Europe (notably England and France) in contrast to the more consciously created modern nations of Eastern Europe, or Africa and Latin America.[3]

The problem with this line of reasoning is that modern China's borders do not correspond to the historic boundaries of shared culture of the ethnic Chinese (or Han) people, nor to the boundaries of the premodern Chinese state. Fully half of the territory of present-day China was acquired by conquest during the Qing dynasty, a dynasty in which the ruling house was not Han Chinese but Manchu intruders from beyond the Great Wall. Most of this expansion took place only in the eighteenth century. Before the Qing dynasty, the borders of China shifted substantially over the centuries, but they generally followed the Great Wall in the north and ended in the foothills of the Tibetan plateau in the west, an area conventionally referred to as "China proper."[4]

The Qing Empire and China

It was only under the Manchus that Mongolia, Tibet, and the Muslim areas of Xinjiang (sometimes called Chinese Turkestan) were incorporated into the empire. The Manchus made allies of neighboring Mongol tribes even before their conquest of China in 1644. Mongols were incorporated into the Qing military apparatus; their princes were given imperial recognition and allocated

specific domains in the Mongol homeland (essentially feudalizing a nomadic people); and the Manchu court routinely took Mongol princesses as imperial consorts. By the early eighteenth century, recalcitrant Mongol tribes in the west were conquered and all of Mongolia was brought under Qing rule. The Mongols followed the Tibetan brand of Buddhism, which was also adopted by the Qing court. This helped to ease the incorporation of Tibet, and the relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor was conceived as between priest and patron, allowing Tibetans to claim the religious authority they most revered, while the Qing asserted political supremacy and backed it up with a resident Manchu commissioner and a small military garrison in Lhasa. Xinjiang was brought into the empire by a long series of military campaigns in the eighteenth century, though revived Muslim resistance required extensive military efforts in the nineteenth century as well.[5]

The Qing made a clear institutional distinction between its rule of China proper and the system of control in the frontier regions. Ninety-five percent of the empire's population was Han Chinese, and especially in its early years, the Manchus made every effort to confine them to China proper, forbidding emigration beyond the Great Wall and banning intermarriage with the peoples of the frontier.[6] China within the Great Wall was ruled through the well-known system of centralized bureaucratic rule with metropolitan officials in Beijing carrying out the court's policies through a territorial administration of provinces, prefectures, and counties. Officials were centrally appointed from a pool generated mostly by the imperial examinations, and local administration was largely left to Han Chinese officials. Both the structure of governance and the content of the Qing legal code were based on the precedents of previous Chinese dynasties, especially those of the Ming court that the Manchus succeeded. In most respects, the Manchu court can be said to have ruled China proper in a Chinese manner.[7]

On the frontiers, the situation was quite different. Simply put, if rule of the Chinese center was centralized and bureaucratic, the prevailing pattern on the ethnic frontiers was indirect and feudal. In this respect, the Qing Empire looked a lot like most other large empires. The emperor related separately to each of the frontier peoples. Pamela Crossley has termed this "simultaneous" emperorship, stressing the distinct cultural modes of each interethnic interaction, and noting the monuments on which imperial instructions were separately inscribed in Manchu, Chinese, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Arabic scripts.[8] Institutionally, the Manchu homeland was administered by Manchu military governors. In Mongolia, the Qing ruled through Mongol princes, hereditary noblemen whose ranks were confirmed by the Qing court, in exchange for which they offered annual tribute. In Tibet, the Qing supported the secular and religious authority of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan nobility from

whom lay officials were chosen. In Xinjiang, the most important oasis cities were controlled by hereditary princes with titles conferred by the Qing court, with more distant regions under an indigenous officialdom of *begs*.[9] Distinct legal regimes prevailed on the frontier, with the Mongols governed by laws more appropriate to their nomadic lifestyle, and Islamic law applied in Chinese Turkestan.[10] All of this was coordinated in the capital by the Court for Frontier Dependencies (*Lifanyuan*)—an office quite distinct from the Six Boards that governed China proper. Significantly, the Court for Frontier Dependencies was the exclusive preserve of Manchus and Mongols. Han Chinese were excluded from interference in frontier affairs.[11] The net result of this institutional arrangement was that the elites of the ethnic frontiers were tied politically and institutionally to the Manchu emperor rather than to the Chinese state. In the case of the Mongols and Tibetans, there was a religious dimension in this special relationship to the Qing, expressed in the Qing court's own strategic adherence to Tibetan Buddhism and the highly visible patronage that emperors provided for temples in their capital and summer hunting retreat. Given the enormous power and prestige of the clerical establishment in Tibet and Mongolia, this spiritual tie provided a bond that a modern secular nation would find difficult to replicate.[12]

Chinese statesmen of the Qing period were quite conscious of the distinct nature of the frontier regions. In modern Chinese, the term for China is *Zhongguo*, often literally translated as "Middle Kingdom." The term is of ancient origins, its earliest usage referring to the "central states" of the pre-unification period. The connotation of *Zhongguo* was the primacy of a culturally distinct core area, centered in the Yellow River valley, as distinguished from the "barbarians" (*yi*) of the periphery. As the meaning of the term evolved, *Zhongguo* always kept this central implication: it was a culturally defined concept, which welcomed the possibility that frontier "barbarians" could be assimilated (*ronghua*) and become part of the Chinese culture area. After the Qin-Han unification of the empire some 2,000 years ago, *Zhongguo* was often applied to the area directly administered by the imperial state.[13] In the Qing, the term became more flexible, with the empire sometimes referred to as the Great Qing (*Da-Qingguo*) and sometimes as *Zhongguo*. The early and mid-Qing emperors repeatedly sought to identify their expanded empire as *Zhongguo*, and the term was commonly used in communications and treaties with foreign states.[14] Domestically, however, not all Chinese accepted this equivalence, as evidenced by criticism of Qianlong's campaigns beyond the traditional borders in the west.[15] A common (and influential) early nineteenth-century conception of *Zhongguo* is provided in the magisterial work, *Shengwuji* (Military history of the Qing dynasty), by the great statecraft scholar Wei Yuan. He began his discussion of the frontier regions in this way:

"Mongolia is the general name for several nomadic polities (*guo*). The seventeen provinces [of China proper] and the three eastern provinces [of Manchuria] are *Zhongguo*. To the west of *Zhongguo* are the Muslim areas, to the south the Tibetans, to the east Korea, and to the north Russia."[16] Thus, Wei Yuan includes Manchuria within *Zhongguo*, but regards the other frontier dependencies as something quite distinct.

The historical geography of imperial China is thus relatively clear. On the frontiers of China proper there were Mongol, Tibetan, and Muslim regions where the languages, cultures, customs, and religions of the native populations were distinct from those of the Han Chinese. Prior to the Qing dynasty, and in most cases prior to the eighteenth century, none of these regions were incorporated into the Chinese empire, despite periodic military forays at the height of the Han and Tang dynasties. To the extent that frontier elites adhered to the Qing, their loyalty was to the Manchu court rather than to China itself. The question thus arises, how were these areas kept within the Chinese polity once the Manchu empire collapsed? How did the Qing become China?

In the popular imagination of the contemporary Western world, this problem is commonly envisioned in terms of the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese Communists' People's Liberation Army in 1950. The flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959, the establishment of a Tibetan government in exile in Dharamsala, and international campaigns to "Free Tibet" have made Tibet the best-known portion of the former Chinese empire with aspirations to national independence. In the Western (and especially the Hollywood) imaginary, the issue is usually framed as an atheistic communist assault on Tibetan culture and religion.[17] While the central Chinese state only established effective direct control of the border regions under the Chinese communists, the Republic of China from its founding in 1912 made the same claims to sovereignty over Tibet and the rest of the Qing Empire as did the People's Republic of China. Indeed, in one important respect, the Republic went even farther—claiming Outer Mongolia as part of China, even after the Soviet-supported founding of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1924. If we are to understand how the new Chinese nation managed to inherit the territory of the Qing, we must focus on the moment of transition from empire to nation—the 1911 Revolution that established the Republic of China.

The 1911 Revolution and Chinese Nationalism

The revolution was sparked by an army mutiny in the central Chinese city of Wuchang on October 10, 1911. The mutiny was led by junior officers who were members of an alliance of revolutionary parties dedicated to the overthrow of

the Manchus and the establishment of republican government. Within weeks, civil and military elites throughout China, but especially in the south, carried out provincial-level coups and declared their independence of the Qing. By the end of the year, representatives of the revolutionary provinces had selected Sun Yat-sen, long the leader of revolutionary groups in exile, to be president of the new republic, which was formally established on the first day of 1912. It took another six weeks for the Qing to abdicate and, with Sun's consent, pass power to the reformist premier and founder of the modern army in north China, Yuan Shikai.[18]

The 1911 Revolution was a relatively quick and painless transition. The ease with which political elites welcomed the establishment of the new republic revealed the extent of their disaffection from the Qing. This disaffection had deep and complex roots, but the most fundamental cause was the dynasty's ineffective defense against the assaults of Western and Japanese imperialism. Defeat in the Sino-French War of 1884–1885 led to French control of the former Chinese tributary state in Vietnam. Ten years later came the shock of military defeat at the hands of Japan, a smaller country long regarded as culturally and politically subordinate to China. This defeat was both humiliating and starkly threatening to the empire, for it not only resulted in another neighboring tributary state, Korea, falling under foreign domination (Japan would annex it as a full colony in 1910), but also produced the first major loss of Chinese territory as the province of Taiwan was ceded to Japan. China's defeat also convinced the European powers that the Qing regime might soon prove unviable, so the British, French, Germans, and Russians soon marked off spheres of influence in moves widely regarded as preparation for the partition of the empire.

In 1900, ultraconservative princes in the Manchu court gave their support to the antiforeign Boxer Uprising, bringing on the occupation of the capital by an international expeditionary force of eight nations, which then forced humiliating terms on the court.[19] This brought to the surface, even among relatively moderate Han officials, widespread sentiment that the Manchus themselves were the source of China's weakness. When in 1904–1905 the Qing could only stand aside and watch as Japan and Russia fought a major war in Manchuria to settle which of them would be the dominant power in the Manchu homeland, even more Chinese were convinced of the feckless nature of Qing rule.[20]

Critics of the Qing fell into two broad camps: reformers and revolutionaries. The revolutionaries, with Sun Yat-sen as their most famous representative, held that overthrowing Manchu rule was the necessary first step to China's revival. The reformers advocated replacing Qing autocracy with constitutional monarchy. For both groups, the primary motivation was nationalism, and all

agreed that only by transforming the subjects of the Qing Empire into citizens with rights to political participation and a stake in their country could one inspire the political, economic, and military commitment necessary to strengthen the country against foreign threats. The Qing court responded with a major New Policies (*xinzheng*) reform program: training a New Army, replacing the exams in the ancient classics with a modern school system, encouraging economic development, building railroads and stringing telegraph lines, establishing a postal system, preparing for constitutional government, and permitting far more open discussion of political affairs in a vibrant newspaper and periodical press.[21]

To understand the nationalist thinking that guided political developments in the early twentieth century, it is instructive to look briefly at the writings of some of the key thinkers. The most influential public intellectual of the era was Liang Qichao, a prolific propagandist and editor of a variety of reformist publications after the Qing drove him into exile in 1898.[22] Liang was a passionate advocate for nationalism, which he called (following Japanese usage) *minzu zhuyi*. The *zhuyi* in this term is simply "-ism," but *minzu* combines the characters for "people" (*min*) and "lineage" (*zu*), thus carrying the sense of a people with shared ancestry—in China often conceived as common descent from the Yellow Emperor.[23] In the usage of the time, it usually meant "nation," but it could also mean simply "people" (as in the Mongol people), nationality, or even "race."[24] Liang wrote in one essay, "Nationalism is the most brilliant, just, and fair of the world's ideologies (*zhuyi*). No other people (*zu*) shall infringe on our freedom, and we do not have the freedom to infringe on the freedom of other peoples."[25]

This was a perfectly sensible statement of the basic principle of nationalist thinking, but it begged the question of who exactly the "Chinese people" were—whose freedom was to be protected and who were to refrain from infringing on the freedom of others. In one famous passage, Liang wrote, "Our greatest source of embarrassment is the fact our country has no name. In common parlance, we refer to the people of Xia, Han, or Tang, which are all dynastic names. Such foreign terms as *Chendan* or *Shina* are not the names we call ourselves." He went on to argue that using dynastic names was an affront to the Chinese nation, while using foreign names denied mastery of one's own identity. In the end, he concluded that although "Middle Kingdom (*Zhongguo*) or *Zhonghua* cannot avoid the appearance of [excessive] pride or self-importance, causing others to ridicule us," still, these terms were the least offensive and the ones "people are used to saying."[26]

As to who was included in the Chinese (*Zhonghua*) nation, Liang was not entirely consistent, but his answer was generally that the Chinese people or nation (*Zhonghua minzu*) were those "conventionally called the Han people."

He went on to argue that the Han people were a historically constructed ethnicity including many groups that had been culturally distinct in ancient times but came to be gradually absorbed and assimilated into one people.[27] After the fall of the Qing, Liang directly confronted the implications of this logic. He noted that common descent, language, and religion were all conducive to nation formation, but the defining feature of a nation was "national consciousness." He observed that in ancient texts, the peoples of southern China had accepted their "barbarian" identity, asserting a cultural difference from "*Zhongguo*" in the north, but over time they had all come to share the same national consciousness. More recently, the Manchus had initially distinguished themselves from the Han, but during the course of the Qing dynasty they had adopted the Chinese language (and forgotten their own) and were now part of the "Chinese nation."[28] The Mongols, by contrast, had always distinguished themselves from the Han, "thus the Mongols, from beginning to end, have never been a part of the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu*)." Nonetheless, Liang argued that the Mongols, like the Muslims of Xinjiang and the Tibetans, lived within the borders of China, that China had historically gained strength from diversity (a sort of multiculturalism in Chinese garb), and that the absorptive power of Han culture throughout history would eventually prove capable of assimilating these people as well.[29]

If Liang Qichao tended to associate the Chinese nation with the Han people, the tendency was even clearer among the revolutionaries, much of whose rhetoric was based on an ethnic Han nationalism fed by anti-Manchu racism. This was, after all, an age in which social Darwinist thinking was extremely influential, and discussions of the Chinese (or Yamato, English, or Aryan) "race" were thoroughly commonplace. Some commentators distinguished the terms *zhongzu* (race) and *minzu* (nation or nationality), though in practice the two were often conflated.[30] Discussions of why the Manchus could not be entrusted to rule China often cited a line from the ancient *Zuozhuan* text that used the common character (*zu*) in these two terms: "Those who are not our kind (*zu*) are certain to be of a different mind."[31] Whether the difference was conceived as racial, ethnic, or national, the revolutionaries consistently regarded the Manchus as Other—and inferior.

Anti-Manchu racism was a staple of revolutionary propaganda. One of the most influential revolutionary tracts was *The Revolutionary Army*, by Zou Rong. Zou excoriates the "lowly nomadic Manchu bandit tribe with its wolf-like ambitions." According to Zou, rule by the Manchus had deprived China of its national character (*guoxing*), racial character (*zhongxing*), and self-reliant character. When he gets around to discussing the Chinese race, Zou Rong's classification is quite remarkable. The Manchus are included as a subset of the Mongols, who are in turn included with the Turkic peoples in a

Siberian race. These are clearly distinguished from the Chinese race (*Zhongguo renzhong*), which includes first the Han people (who are equated to "the Chinese" [*Zhongguo ren*]) and also the Koreans, Thais, Japanese, Tibetans, and "other East Asian peoples." The publication of Zou's pamphlet in 1903 was an important moment in the activation of Han Chinese nationalism. He imagined a bright future for the Chinese, who in ancient times had populated the neighboring countries of East Asia, then migrated to Southeast Asia and the Americas in the modern era, and soon promised to become "the masters of the twentieth-century world."[32]

Zhang Binglin, a noted classical scholar who became editor of the revolutionary paper *Minbao*, produced a steady stream of revolutionary propaganda from exile in Japan. Known for his virulent anti-Manchu rhetoric, Zhang combed Chinese history for references to the barbaric and subhuman character of the nomadic peoples on China's northern borders.[33] For our purposes, one of his most important essays is entitled "Explaining the Republic of China," in which he lays out the parameters of the republic that the revolutionaries wished to form. He begins by examining the meaning of *Zhongguo* and *Zhonghua*, arguing in familiar terms that they are really "names of an ethnic group (*wenhua zhi zu*)." It is culture that defines what it means to be Chinese: "Ritual and ethics (*lijiao*) are the standard." Thus, it is possible for barbarians, if they absorb Chinese culture and assimilate, to become Chinese.

He then turns to the critical question of China's borders. "The borders of *Zhongguo* are the counties and prefectures of the Han dynasty and the people are called the Hua [Chinese] people. If we only take the borders of the Han, then Mongolia, the Muslim areas, and Tibet are not on the map; managing them will have to wait." Returning to his cultural standard of what it means to be Chinese, Zhang then notes that Korea and Vietnam have similar customs and use the Chinese written language, so they should be included in the Republic of China—though he admits that their political independence of China (and control by the rival empires of Japan and France) make this impractical. By contrast, the Tibetans, Muslims, and Mongols have no customs in common with China, except the Tibetans' Buddhist religion. So to these, Zhang essentially offers self-determination: "We should let them stay or leave as they choose."

In principle, then, Zhang's ethnic nationalism leads to the conclusion that the Qing dynasty's frontier dependencies were not part of China and should be allowed to determine their own fate. He then cites a number of practical considerations that suggest a quite different approach. In contrast to Vietnam and Korea (which should be part of China but have fallen under foreign imperialist domination), Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet, though not originally part of China, at least do not belong to anyone else. They could accordingly

be incorporated into the new Republic of China if properly assimilated. He explains how this might be done (though not in terms that the targets of assimilation would necessarily find attractive). The Muslims, Zhang says, are very clever so they can be educated—aided by the many Han colonists in Xinjiang. The Mongols are stupid, but the Han merchants who trade with them can help transform them. Sinicizing the Tibetans would have to begin with language, as they are the most isolated. So Han colonization, trade, and cultural assimilation are the mechanisms whereby the Republic of China might hold on to the frontier regions of the Qing.[34]

With such thinking dominating the revolutionary ranks, it is hardly surprising that the 1911 Revolution broke out under the banner of Han nationalism. The Chinese nation was generally conceived as coterminous with the Han people—and it was in order to revive the fortunes of the glorious Han nation that the Manchu yoke was thrown off. Proclamations of the revolutionary government in Wuchang repeatedly appealed to the aspirations for self-government by the people of the eighteen provinces of China proper, which were represented on the revolutionary flag by eighteen stars.[35] This Han Chinese nationalism was ritually celebrated in a ceremony attended by the revolutionary leaders in honor of the Yellow Emperor. A military anthem was played, with the following inspiring verses:

> Raise the Han, raise the Han,
> Raise our great Han.
> Destroy the Manchu, destroy the Manchu.
> Destroy the thieving Manchu.
> The spirit of the Yellow Emperor
> Helps us to kill the thieves.[36]

In the first weeks of the uprising, the revolutionary press was full of talk of revenge against the Manchus and "racial revolution." Nor was this simply a matter of rhetoric: in Wuchang and several other cities (most notably Xi'an) there were pogroms of wholesale slaughter of Manchus in their garrisons.[37]

The 1911 Revolution and the Frontier

If this was the 1911 Revolution viewed from the Chinese center—rising Han Chinese nationalism resulting in a "racial revolution" to overthrow the Manchus because of their ineffective resistance to imperialist encroachment—what did the process look like from the periphery? As we have seen, the fundamental Qing policy involved a systematic differentiation of the ethnic frontiers from the Han areas of China proper. Over time, however, this

distinction was gradually attenuated. In Mongolia, more and more elements of the Qing code were introduced into the Mongol statutes, until by the nineteenth century the Mongol regions were basically governed by the same laws as China proper.[38] In Manchuria, the Qing prohibited Han settlement so as to "preserve the upright and ancient customs of the Manchus" and prevent their "tainting by Han customs." It set aside agricultural land as bannerland and proscribed its sale to Chinese. But over time, illegal Han migrants bought up most of this bannerland and established a customary legal regime for land transactions which mirrored that of the north China plain whence they had come.[39] By the late eighteenth century, Han migrants had become so numerous in parts of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia that counties on the model of those in China proper were established alongside the Manchu and Mongol banner institutions, to govern the Han population.[40] In Xinjiang, the Qing state found it necessary to promote trade to finance this eighteenth-century addition to the empire, and Han merchants soon brought their customs, culture, and families to the "New Dominions" of the west. Their settlements were initially called "Manchu cities" (*Mancheng*) after the Qing garrisons they served, but by the 1840s, they were known as "Han cities" (*Hancheng*) in a process that has been characterized as the "Hanization" of the empire.[41]

In the first half of the Qing reign, commerce and colonization by the surplus population of north China were the main forces driving this gradual assimilation of the frontier regions. But even in this early period, the threat posed by the Russian expansion across Siberia impelled a closer attention to the periphery. As early as the seventeenth century, the Qing enlisted Jesuit missionaries to carry out a systematic mapping of its frontiers, an effort that paralleled other early modern states' efforts to mark their borders and control the populations within them.[42]

The nineteenth century brought a further mitigation of the distinction between the lands within and beyond the Great Wall. Han Chinese migration into Manchuria and Inner Mongolia accelerated, so that by the end of the century their numbers far exceeded those of the native populations. In Xinjiang, when the Muslim rebellions of midcentury were suppressed by Han Chinese armies, many soldiers stayed on as military colonists, thus enhancing the Han presence. By 1884, the growing Russian threat in the fertile Ili River region led to the reorganization of Xinjiang into a province, making it the first of the frontier regions to be fully incorporated into the administrative apparatus of China proper.[43]

By the end of the nineteenth century, the imperialist threat was a major complicating factor in center-periphery relations. The challenge to Qing supremacy in East Asia naturally began on the imperial frontiers—in a process parallel to that experienced by the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean

region. On the outer edges of the Qing world order were the tributaries to the Qing court: states that acknowledged the Manchu emperor as Son of Heaven, offered regular tribute, and had their rulers' authority endorsed by the emperor in return.[44] These were the first to drift away or fall under the control of one of the Great Powers. Thus, Vietnam was absorbed into French Indochina, and the Ryuku Islands and Korea were dominated by and eventually incorporated into the Japanese empire. Then the inner periphery was threatened. In 1895, the offshore island of Taiwan was lost to Japan. In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, the two powers signed agreements to recognize Russia's preeminent interests in Mongolia and northern Manchuria (where the Chinese-Eastern railway linked the Trans-Siberian railroad to Vladivostok), while Japan claimed southern Manchuria and adjacent portions of Inner Mongolia as its sphere. Fears that Russia would dominate Central Asia from the north led Britain to seek greater influence in Tibet, to protect its position in India. Thus, in 1903–1904 the Younghusband expedition was dispatched to Lhasa, a serious military challenge to Qing sovereignty there.[45]

The Qing response was predictable: it sought to strengthen central control of the periphery, a move that fundamentally challenged the established distinction between direct control through provincial and county administrators in China proper, and indirect rule through ethnic elites on the frontier. As noted above, Xinjiang was made a province in 1884. In an attempt to check Russian and Japanese designs on Manchuria, a new governor-general's office was established there in 1907, governors were appointed to the three northeastern provinces, and Han Chinese officials pressed an aggressive program of economic, political, and military modernization. Thus the Qing homeland ceased to be a special Manchu domain and was integrated into the administrative system of China proper.[46] There were proposals to transform Mongolia and Tibet into provinces as well, but the Qing was not prepared to move so quickly on that front. The court did, however, establish a number of new counties in the areas of Inner Mongolia in which Han Chinese farmers were settling in large numbers.[47]

By this time Qing proscriptions against Han migration into the border regions had been completely reversed. Far from trying to keep Han away from the frontier regions, now the court actively encouraged settlement. Surveys were made of Mongol lands and resources, offices were established to promote colonization, and laws forbidding the intermarriage of Han and Mongols were abolished. Most of this migration was into Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, where Han greatly outnumbered Mongols and Manchus by the end of the dynasty, but there were extensive Han agricultural colonies in Outer Mongolia as well. The new arrivals were not particularly solicitous of the peoples whose lands they were occupying. In the words of an English traveler, "Very notice-

able was the air of superiority assumed by the Chinese, as if they wished to impress on all that they were the ruling race. The Russians and Mongolians almost fraternized, but the Chinese traveler treated the Russian with almost the same scant courtesy as he dealt out to the unfortunate Mongol."[48]

In the final years of its rule, the Qing extended its New Policy reforms to the border regions. The most dramatic efforts were made in Ulan Batur in Outer Mongolia. There the Manchu commissioner established an Office of Military Training as the basis for a Mongol army on the frontier. Other bureaus were founded for police training, public hygiene, commerce, agriculture, economic development, and foreign relations. A school was established to educate a new Mongol elite in the modernizing way of the reformed Qing Empire. All of this was quite costly, and the burden fell on a resentful local population. In addition, the conservative clerical establishment in Ulan Batur did not exactly welcome these intrusions, and conflicts between monks and Chinese merchants and administrators became a significant source of tension.[49]

In Tibet, conflict was even more pronounced. Major problems began with the British invasion of 1903–1904, which led to the occupation of Lhasa, the flight of the Dalai Lama to Mongolia, and his dismissal by the Qing court. The British incursion sparked a vigorous Qing response, the initial focus of which was to extend direct control to the Kham region—the largely Tibetan areas between Sichuan province and central Tibet. The clerical establishment was particularly targeted: decrees limited the number of monks, resisting monasteries were destroyed, and tribute previously paid to monasteries was now demanded as taxes for the state. Meanwhile, a Chinese school and military college were established in Lhasa and roads and telegraph lines were planned to link Tibet more closely to China. The Dalai Lama sought relief from any possible quarter, first appealing for Russian aid, then, when this effort was rebuffed, seeking to make peace with the Qing, and finally returning to Lhasa in 1909. No sooner had he arrived in Lhasa than the Qing sent a large military force to control him, causing him to flee to India. From there, the Dalai Lama sought to enlist the British as intermediaries in an effort to negotiate a new relationship with the Qing.[50]

A similar dynamic ensued in Mongolia, as the intrusive New Policy reforms drove the Mongols to seek independence even before the 1911 Revolution. There, too, the clerical leadership was critical, and it also sought help abroad to realize Mongol aspirations for autonomy. A diverse group of Inner and Outer Mongol leaders gathered around the religious leader of the Mongols, the "Living Buddha" Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, and in July 1911 sent a delegation to St. Petersburg seeking Russian support. Their petition to the tsar stressed the importance of Tibetan "yellow-sect" Buddhism among the Mongols and noted that they had "respectfully submitted to Manchu Khans earlier,

because they [the Manchus] had worshipped in the Buddhist religion and spread the blessings." Common religion was the bond that united the Mongols and Manchus. "[B]ut in recent years," the petition continued, "high ranking Chinese [*sic*] officials have become powerful and begun to meddle in our national affairs. In particular, the worst thing is their violation, in the name of the 'New Policy', of the old traditions by taking over land to use for farming." The Mongols' primary complaint was against the New Policy reforms and increased Han migration, and the perceived threat to their religion was a key motivating factor. Thus, they appealed for Russian support: "As we know, from international precedents, any weak and small nation which can rely on a bigger and stronger nation can become independent."[51]

As the preceding narrative shows, when the 1911 Revolution broke out, both Tibet and Mongolia were already poised to assert their independence. The other frontier areas were less threatened. The three northeastern provinces of Manchuria were by that time largely populated by Han Chinese. In Xinjiang, the process of "Hanization" had been going on since the eighteenth century as Qing emperors encouraged trade and Han colonization to bolster the frontier economy. Perhaps even more significantly, these were also the areas that had been fully integrated into the Chinese administrative structure of provincial and local officials. But in Tibet and Mongolia a hereditary aristocracy and a powerful yellow-hat Buddhist clerical establishment in well-funded and broadly supported monasteries provided independent sources of power and authority for peoples who sought to form new nation-states. In both regions, the preeminent religious figure became the leader and rallying point for the new regime: the Dalai Lama in Tibet and Jebtsundamba Khutughtu in Mongolia.

In Tibet, the 1911 Revolution first sparked a mutiny of the Qing garrison against the Manchu commissioner (*amban*), and then a successful Tibetan effort to drive off the Chinese troops, who demonstrated little will to remain in this distant and unforgiving frontier post. The Dalai Lama returned from exile and declared that the patron-priest relationship that had tied his predecessors to the Manchu emperors was at an end and Tibet would henceforth be independent. Though skirmishes between Tibetans and Chinese in the Kham border region continued throughout the republican era, central Tibet established a de facto independent regime which would last until 1950.[52] In Mongolia, after news of the Wuchang Uprising reached Ulan Batur, the leaders of the independence movement declared the Bogd Jebtsundamba Khutughtu Great Khan of the Mongol nation. Their position was quite clear: Mongolia's subordination was to the Qing, and now that the Chinese had risen against the Qing, Mongolia should resume its independent status. As one group of nobles put it: "Originally Mongolia was not part of China, but

because it followed the Ch'ing [Qing] royal house from the first day, it owed that house a great debt. Mongolia has absolutely no connection at all with China. Consequently, today when the Ch'ing court has been destroyed, Mongolia has no natural connection with China and should be independent."[53] Others spoke in terms closer to the modern rhetoric of national self-determination: "We Mongols have different traditions, language and literature from those of the Chinese. Our Mongolian and Chinese cultures are as far apart as heaven and earth."[54] As news of anti-Manchu violence by Chinese revolutionary forces reached Mongolia, the Mongol leadership became even more convinced that there was no place for them within a Han-dominated Republic of China.[55] Their new parliament vowed to "protect our race, protect our religion, and protect our territorial integrity."[56]

Defining the Republic of China

This was a critical turning point in modern Chinese history. How would the new Republic of China respond to Tibetan and Mongol attempts to establish independent nations of their own? It has been noted that adjustments in a nation's borders tend to be made early in its history, and once adjusted, borders remain remarkably stable.[57] We have already seen that prominent public intellectuals of this era, from Liang Qichao to Zhang Binglin, questioned whether Mongolia, Tibet, and the Muslim areas should be included within China. The critical question in the first years of the Republic is what I would call the Atatürk counterfactual: Why did the leaders of the Chinese nation that emerged from the Qing *not* make the same choice as the leaders of the Turkish nation that emerged from the Ottoman Empire? The foundational statement of Turkey's nationalist program, the National Pact, stated that "The territories inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority (united in religion, race, and aim) formed an indivisible whole, but the fate of the territories inhabited by an Arab majority, which were under foreign occupation, should be determined by plebiscite." A similar right to secession was offered to Ottoman provinces ceded to Russia in 1878 but later granted autonomy by the Bolsheviks, and to western Thrace.[58] The question thus becomes: Why did the Han Chinese who led the 1911 Revolution not concentrate their nation-building efforts on the (relatively) culturally homogeneous Han areas of China proper, making the same offer of independence through plebiscite to the ethnically distinct peoples on the periphery of the former Qing Empire?

Recall that when the revolution broke out in Wuchang in October 1911, it was in the name of Han national self-determination, and the revolutionary flag of eighteen stars represented the eighteen provinces of China proper.

Within a few weeks, however, as former constitutional monarchists and army officers joined the revolutionary camp, the vision of a new republic encompassing the five major nationalities—Han, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Muslims—gained precedence.[59] Still, in the first months of the new republic, debate on this issue continued, phrased as a contest between the Greater China principle (*Da Zhongguo zhuyi*) and China Proper (*Benbu Zhongguo*) position.[60] The supporters of the latter view essentially advocated the Atatürk solution: preserving China proper but "placing the rest in a category that could be included or not." An article summarizing this debate in early 1912 (written, it must be noted, by a proponent of the Greater China position) stated the heart of the China Proper argument in the following terms: "Although China is divided among five peoples, actually only the Han have a national consciousness and political understanding. The Manchus and Muslims lag behind. The Mongols and Tibetans are like a herd of animals, primitive, simple, and isolated. They have no idea what national politics are all about." The China Proper advocates admitted that the Great Powers coveted the frontier regions, but argued that it would be possible to insist on genuine independence for the frontier peoples, with a guarantee from the powers that they would not interfere. In this way, it was thought, China could avoid frontier conflicts that would weaken the young republic.[61]

It is clear, however, that the China Proper position was a minority viewpoint in public debate under the young republic. The uniformly nationalistic press provided, as one foreign paper put it, "safety valves which are allowing hotheaded patriots to vent their energies,"[62] and these patriots readily adopted an expansive conception of the Chinese nation. Often the Japanese, including an associate of Sun Yat-sen, were blamed for advocating the China Proper position as a means to advance their own designs on Manchuria.[63] Who in China might have supported this position is unclear. Presumably some of the committed Han nationalists who had rallied to the eighteen-star flag still supported a nation of China Proper. One foreign paper claimed that a "high Chinese official" allowed that the loss of Mongolia would mean only "one less incumbrance [sic]" and essentially supported the China Proper position.[64] In addition, the Chinese press often lamented the lack of public outcry against Mongolian independence—suggesting that many people did not regard this as a major loss.[65] It is likely that some merchants and businessmen would have preferred that the government spend less of their tax dollars on distant frontiers and more on developing China proper. Nonetheless, articulate arguments for a republic limited to China proper are difficult to find. That, however, is less important than the fact that the debate did occur. For what we really need to understand are the arguments for the position that prevailed: the Greater China view.

On New Year's Day 1912, in his inaugural speech as provisional president of the Republic of China, Sun Yat-sen enunciated the fundamental principle that the new regime would be a republic of five peoples that would include all of the territory of the Qing: "The people are the foundation of the state. Unifying the Han territories, Manchuria, Mongolia, the Muslim lands, and Tibet means uniting the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui [Muslim], and Tibetan ethnicities (*zu*) as one people (*yiren*). This is called the unity of the nation (*minzu*)."[66] When the Qing abdicated six weeks later, the edict concluded with wishes for peace and "the continued territorial integrity of the lands of the five races, Manchu, Han, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetans in one great Republic of China."[67] The conventional phrase to capture this new ideal was "the five races as one family" (*wuzu yijia*), reflected in the new five-bar national flag of the republic, with one color for each of the major ethnic groups.[68] In the first year of the republic, prominent politicians, intellectuals, and military leaders formed a number of new associations to promote ethnic harmony and national unity: the Republican Unity Society (*Gonghe tongyi hui*), the Republic of China Great Harmony Association (*Zhonghua minguo datong hui*), the Society for the Progress of Citizens of the Five Races (*Wuzu guomin hejin hui*), to name a few. The last of these even proposed a shared bloodline linking all to a common ancestor in ancient China—a seemingly desperate attempt to construct an ethnic-genealogical definition of the nation that included more than just the Han.[69]

This new rhetoric of ethnic unity had some difficulty in displacing the discourse of Han restoration and anti-Manchu "racial revolution" (*zhongzu geming*). A front-page editorial in the leading revolutionary paper, *Minlibao*, stated in early November 1911, "Once we have wreaked our great revenge and the republic is established, then we must combine the Muslims, Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus into one state (*guo*) with equal rights."[70] Revenge against the Manchus was still endorsed as the first stage of the revolution—without acknowledging that acts of revenge would certainly complicate later efforts at unity. Another article explained that this was a racial revolution only because the government was Manchu controlled and it was necessary to overthrow the Manchu minority. But a few lines later, the author proclaimed that "an inferior minority people (*minzu*) certainly cannot rule over a superior majority people."[71] The superiority of the Han was an unshakeable conviction in the revolutionary camp. Even in an article directly addressed to Manchu bannermen, which made the usual argument that "this is a political revolution, not a racial revolution," there appeared the boast that "Half of the empire is already held by the Great Han (*Da-Han*)." It promised that once the republic was formed the Han would "regard all with equal benevolence" (*yishi tongren*), using a conventional phrase that the Manchu emperors pledged to their subjects. Such talk left no doubt that in the new republic, the Han would be running the show.[72]

How this new republic was conceived, and how its leaders proposed to deal with the frontier peoples, is most easily examined in terms of relations with the Mongols, for the "Mongol Problem" was the most frequent focus of public discussion. To the Mongols (as to all others) the republic first promised freedom and equality of treatment. In 1912, a commissioner was sent to a Mongol area in the northeast to explain the meaning of the republic and the president who headed it. His message, recorded in extremely simple colloquial Chinese (presumably the language deemed appropriate to "stupid Mongols"), was that a president was chosen by the people for his talent and virtue, and the principle of equality of the races meant that if an appropriately qualified Mongol were to arise, he too could be president.[73] The problem was that the most influential people in the Mongol lands were the princes. They were realistic enough to recognize that they were hardly likely to be elected president, and that equality threatened their privileged access to land and the stipends they had received from the imperial government. Thus a group of Mongol princes and lamas in Beijing formed a United Mongol Society (*Menggu lianhehui*) which met with the new president, Yuan Shikai, in the spring of 1912, demanding that the princes' land rights be protected and their stipends be unchanged from what they received under the Qing. In general, Yuan and his more conservative party favored preserving some privileges for the princes—in an obvious attempt to tie them to the new republic. But the more radical republicans were generally opposed. The ability to grant stipends and patents of nobility to frontier elites was one clear advantage that an empire had over a republic of citizens equal under the law. The Chinese republic tried to get around this by recognizing the local political authority of the princes, offering them official titles, and treating them with ritual respect. This was one of the many ways in which the institutions of empire continued under the republic, but it was a constant source of tension for the new regime.[74]

To any Mongol who had access to the Chinese press, the promises of equal citizenship in the republic were unlikely to be very persuasive. In much of the public discussion of the Mongol question, references to the "stupid Mongols" (*yu-Meng*) were so common as to become a conventional epithet.[75] The secular modernists of the new republic were overtly hostile to the powerful Lamaist clergy in Mongolia (and Tibet). The fact that these frontier regions chose religious leaders to head their governments only confirmed the revolutionaries' view that these lands were too steeped in superstition to be ready for national self-determination.[76]

In all the discussion of which peoples were to be included in the new Republic of China, there were few convincing arguments that the five "races" of China really constituted a single nation. The mantra of "five races as one family" was endlessly repeated, but nobody really tried to demonstrate why they

constituted a single family; nobody was able to show—especially show to the satisfaction of the Tibetans and Mongols—why they constituted one nation. The arguments that dominated the public debate were far more pragmatic and instrumental. Two themes were prominent above all others: the loss of the frontiers would expose China proper to partition; and the Mongols and Tibetans were too weak and backward to protect themselves from foreign control, so they should be assimilated and modernized under Chinese leadership.

The first argument was made most succinctly in an article that appeared in the revolutionary paper *Minlibao* in the spring of 1911, even before the revolution broke out:

> Mongolia, the Muslim lands, and Tibet have long been included in our territory. Together they form China's border screen (*pingfan*). If Mongolia were lost, it would be impossible to protect the lands north of the Yellow River. If the Muslim frontier were lost, then the Guanzhong area [around Xi'an] could not rest in peace. If Tibet were lost, the southwestern provinces could not sleep easily. If we wish to defend China proper and the northeast provinces, we must first defend Mongolia, the Muslim lands, and Tibet. But in race, religion, and customs, these lands are different from us. If we do not first promote the ideal of the nation-state (*guojia*) and explain the relationship of the races, once the old regime is overthrown and the new state is established, the Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans may secede from our country and follow some foreign power.[77]

The notion of the frontier areas as a border screen (*pingfan* or *fanli*) was a common theme and derived from a comparable Qing usage. In a sense, these areas were treated as a buffer zone to protect China proper from foreign threats.[78] The discourse reflected the fundamentally subordinate and instrumental role that frontier peoples were given in the new republic: their job was to protect the Chinese heartland.

Needless to say, this attitude denied the Mongols and Tibetans the capacity to form nation-states in their own right. The metanarrative of modern world history takes the nation-state as the active agent, tells a story of nation building and emerging national consciousness across the globe, and locates the subject of history in the nation.[79] Chinese intellectuals and politicians had no difficulty in locating their own history within this narrative, as they saw China struggling to cast off the Manchu yoke, acquiring a new sense of national consciousness and patriotism, and fending off imperialist threats in order to build a strong, prosperous, and independent nation. But they seemed quite incapable of imagining that Mongols and Tibetans could be engaged in the very same process in their own right.

When Mongolia declared its independence and announced to the Chinese that it had "elevated the Bogd as the Khaan and our nation is called 'Mongol,'"[80]

the reply of Yuan Shikai, the new president of the Republic, was distinctly condescending in both tone and substance:

> My honorable Lama, we know you are merciful to all creatures and are honest and loyal. Therefore, I would like to explain to you the matter of benefits and harm in order to avoid any misunderstanding. If any country in the world wants to be independent it must have enough people, finance, and military power, and effective political and judicial institutions, before it can exist and ultimately become an independent nation. Otherwise it will be annexed by other countries.

He went on to explain that Mongolia's population was small, less than that of one Chinese province; its economy was backward and unable to support a strong state; its soldiers still fought with bows and arrows and did not know how to use guns; and its governance was still based on a feudal system distinctly lacking in the elements of modern administration.[81]

Given this view of the backward and inherently subordinate circumstances of the frontier peoples, the Chinese solution was quite consistent: the Han migration and agricultural development of Mongolia and Xinjiang, which had begun during the late Qing, should be encouraged, accelerated, and organized. In the host of publications on "the Mongol problem" and frontier affairs that appeared in the early years of the republic, this was an unvarying theme.[82] The fact that Han migration had been a prime factor provoking Mongol aspirations for independence in the first place was rarely acknowledged in these writings. It was simply the best way to develop the region, to spread the Chinese culture and education that would tie the frontier more closely to China, and to provide the fiscal base for a frontier regime capable of warding off foreign intervention. When agents of these policies encountered local resistance, it was typically attributed to "stupid Mongols who lack understanding."[83]

Imperialism on the Frontiers

Lurking behind this Chinese skepticism of Mongol and Tibetan capacity for national independence was the conviction that their aspirations for liberation were being manipulated by foreign powers. This was not altogether a figment of the Chinese imagination. After all, in the run-up to independence the Mongols had sent a delegation to St. Petersburg to plead for Russian support, and the Dalai Lama in 1911 was in India seeking aid from the British imperial authorities. In the negotiations with China following the 1911 Revolution, both Mongols and Tibetans demanded mediation by their foreign protectors.[84] As we have seen, in their initial approach to the tsar, the Mongols described themselves as a "weak and small nation" that required the assistance of the

stronger Russians. We must also recognize that the feudal nature of Mongol and Tibetan governance, plus the fact that both new governments (and especially that of Tibet) had a fundamentally theocratic nature, meant that the administrative structures typically associated with successful nation building were in fact lacking in these regions. For these reasons, Chinese suspicion that Mongolia and Tibet would be easy targets for imperialist manipulation were not entirely unfounded.

There was also good reason to be suspicious of the imperial ambitions of Britian and Russia. The British, after all, had earlier sent a military expedition to occupy Lhasa in Tibet. The Russians maintained a small military presence in Ulan Batur, and in 1911 Russian policy toward China was particularly aggressive. The Sino-Russian Treaty of 1881, which had solved an early crisis over the Ili region in Xinjiang, was up for renewal in 1911. In the spring, the Russians presented the Chinese with an ultimatum that was regarded as a threat of war unless commercial and other concessions were made along the Qing Empire's northern border and the Russian-controlled railway in northern Manchuria. In the words of the Qing minister of war, "all Russian measures have the object to tear Mongolia from us."[85] The Russian presence in Ulan Batur was so important that when the Chinese press received news from Mongolia, it typically came through Russian diplomats in Beijing, and there was understandable fear that Mongolia's independence movement was being manipulated from abroad.[86]

These fears reached their peak in November 1912, with the signing of the Russian-Mongol agreement guaranteeing Mongol autonomy. The agreement followed a secret but widely reported Russo-Japanese Entente of July, which established the two powers' respective spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia.[87] The Russians recognized "self-rule" in Mongolia and promised assistance to prevent Chinese military forces or migrants from entering Mongol territory, in return for which they gained substantial advantages of commercial access to the region.[88] The reaction in China was quick and furious. The press was full of calls for immediate military action from opinion leaders and army officers across the country. Nationalists from the former revolutionary parties soon to emerge victorious in parliamentary elections were particularly outspoken, and the pressure on President Yuan Shikai to do something was intense.[89]

Especially notable in the public outcry over the Russo-Mongol agreement was the utter eclipse of any discussion of Mongol aspirations or even of Mongolia's place within the new Republic. The issue was now Russian interference in Chinese affairs. As one article put it, "this is not an internal matter, but an external one (*duiwai*)"—a matter of confronting an imperialist threat to partition the nation.[90] The well-worn anti-imperialist discourse of protecting the

nation from partition was mobilized in defense of the new republic, and it served to sublimate any discussion of who should properly be part of the nation. By acting in concert with Russia, the Mongols could not be recognized as independent political agents in their own right, and were no longer a subject of debate in China. Now it was all about resisting Russia.

There was one further important complication. The Russo-Mongol agreement had supported Mongol self-rule, but it failed to specify the borders of an autonomous Mongolia. This was not entirely accidental, for the Mongols in Ulan Batur—who included several activists from Inner Mongolia—insisted on a Greater Mongolia that would include all lands occupied by the Mongols under the Qing. The Russians, however, were primarily interested in Outer Mongolia, and had already conceded Japan's preeminent interest in the Inner Mongolian areas bordering on Manchuria. The compromise left the borders unspecified, and soon Greater Mongol nationalists began supporting raids on Chinese settlers in Inner Mongolia.[91] In most of the affected areas, the population was now overwhelmingly Han Chinese—as high as 95 percent in some parts.[92] As a result, these Mongol raids were widely portrayed as rebel attacks on Chinese territory. Since the Mongols were regarded as pawns of the Russians, such frontier incursions only enhanced fears that the loss of Mongolia would put all of north China in danger.[93]

Exactly the same dynamic was evident on the Tibetan frontier. One of the persistent difficulties in Chinese-Tibetan relations in the modern era has been the specification of the borders of Tibet. In particular, the Chinese have resisted claims of the Lhasa authorities (and now of the Tibetan exile regime in Dharamsala) to a Greater Tibet that includes the Kham region of eastern Sichuan and the Tibetan areas of Qinghai. Soon after the Tibetans declared independence, they sent troops to attack Chinese outposts in the disputed regions. When the Chinese, Tibetans, and British attempted to negotiate a new status for Tibet in 1914—negotiations in which the Chinese were willing to grant full autonomy to the Dalai Lama's government in Outer Tibet (or Central Tibet, depending on one's perspective)—the agreement ultimately broke down over the borders of the Tibetan territory.[94]

On the frontier between China proper and the ethnic periphery, and especially in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang, the demographic explosion that tripled the Han population during the Qing period propelled an inexorable tide of Han migrants into the ethnic borderlands. The result was the usual complex mosaic of interspersed ethnic enclaves that one sees on the ethnic frontiers of any former empire. As the process of imperial (and later post-socialist) collapse in Europe has demonstrated, these are the most difficult places to draw coherent new state boundaries. From the standpoint of the center, the best way to avoid conflict—whether domestic or international—is to

draw the line at the imperial boundaries. The boundaries of the Qing had the advantage of being set by treaty, especially on the northern border with Russia. They were, consequently, a good deal clearer than the internal ethnic frontiers. When the educational reforms of the late Qing introduced geography into the curriculum, textbooks were written to publicize those boundaries. As a result, the emerging Chinese citizenry may not have known what it meant to be Chinese (or in what way the Mongols and Tibetans were also Chinese), but it did know that Mongolia and Tibet were included within the territory of China.[95]

This brings us to the final irony in the story of how China maintained the borders of the empire. As we have seen, the Chinese of the early republican era presented few coherent arguments to explain the principles of inclusion in the new Chinese nation. Their most consistent and compelling argument was that the frontier regions must be kept as a protective screen to guard against the partition of China proper. The threat of imperialism—the fear that the Great Powers would carve China up like a melon—was the rationale that trumped all others. There is no question that this threat was real. Japan had already taken Taiwan and Korea and established a foothold in southern Manchuria; Russia was insisting on a special position in northern Manchuria and Mongolia; Great Britain demanded autonomy for Tibet as a condition for recognizing the new Republic;[96] and the other powers were marking off "spheres of influence" as well. But it is equally true that some powers, most notably Great Britain, the United States, and Germany, were convinced that their economic interests were best served by preserving the territorial integrity of China. This was the case during the late Qing dynasty, when John Hay's "Open Door" notes sought to commit the powers to recognize the territorial integrity of the Qing Empire. It was equally true when the Republic of China presented itself as the successor state of the Qing, willing to honor the debts and treaty obligations of the former dynasty.[97] As the U.S. secretary of state, Philander Knox, stated on the eve of the Manchu abdication, "It is therefore evident to this Government that all the powers have up to the present by common consent not only refrained from independent action and from interfering in China's internal affairs, but have acted in full accord with their mutual assurances that they would respect its integrity and sovereignty."[98]

This was not mere rhetoric, nor was it wishful thinking. Even the powers most involved in the independence movements on China's frontiers, the Russians in Mongolia and the British in Tibet, in the end supported solutions that acknowledged China's sovereignty while endorsing some form of autonomy for the Tibetans and Mongolians.[99] The consensus on respecting the territorial integrity of China within the borders of the Qing broke down in only one instance. After the Bolshevik Revolution, when the Soviet Union was confronted with White Russian armies operating from Mongolia, it sponsored a

Mongolian communist revolution in Outer Mongolia, which was thenceforth permanently separated from Chinese territory. Otherwise, the Republic of China remained intact—its willingness to assume the financial and treaty obligations of the Qing earning international recognition of its sovereignty within the Qing borders.

In the end, then, the international environment may have been decisive in determining that China alone would keep its territory intact as it was transformed from an empire to a nation. On the frontiers of the former Qing Empire, the Great Powers showed none of the commitment to national self-determination that the Versailles Conference endorsed in the Habsburg and Ottoman lands of Eastern Europe and the Balkans in the wake of World War I. At the same time, the imperialist actions of the powers inspired in the Han Chinese a new sense of nationalism, a commitment to determine China's own destiny, and to develop the country economically, politically, and militarily so that it would no longer endure the humiliations inflicted on the Qing. If the new Republic of China was to overcome and reverse the weakness of the Qing, it could hardly accept borders that were less than those of the Manchu regime. So the threat of imperialism was real enough to inspire the Chinese nationalism that claimed the territory of the Qing, but not so real as to bring the actual breakup of empire.

Notes

I would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Brent Haas, Jeremy Murray, Zhang Jun, and Zheng Xiaowei in the preparation of this essay, and Miles Kahler and the other participants in the "Empire to Nation" conference for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

1. Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001). Edward Walker in this volume argues powerfully that regarding the Soviet Union as an "empire" is a recent and questionable usage.

2. Joseph R. Levenson developed the notion of Chinese "culturalism" in his *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*, esp. vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958). For more recent discussions of Chinese culturalism and nationalism, see Henrietta Harrison, *Inventing the Nation: China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1–3, 9–32; Michael Ng-Quinn, "National Identity in Premodern China: Formation and Role Enactment," in *China's Quest for National Identity*, ed. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 32–61; James Townsend, "Chinese Nationalism," 1–30, and Prasenjit Duara, "De-Constructing the Chinese Nation," 31–55 in *Chinese Nationalism*, ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996). For a Chinese perspective, see Li Guoqi, "Zhongguo jindai minzu sixiang" (Modern Chinese nationalist thought) in *Jindai Zhongguo sixiang renwu lun: Minzu zhuyi* (Essays on major figures in modern China and their thinking: national-

ism), ed. Li Guoqi (Taibei, Taiwan: Shibao wenhua chubanshe, 1982 [first edition: 1970]), 19–43.

3. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 137.

4. The main exception to this pattern came in the second and first centuries BCE when the aggressive Han dynasty emperor Wudi established military colonies in desert oases to the west, in what is now Xinjiang. Also, of course, during the Yuan dynasty (1264–1368), the Mongols ruled a much larger empire from a capital in present-day Beijing.

5. Joseph Fletcher, "Ch'ing Central Asia, c. 1800" and "The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 10: *Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 35–106, 351–408. See also the special issue of the *International History Review* 20, no. 2 (June 1998) on Manchu colonialism; Owen Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria: Their Tribal Divisions, Geographical Distribution, Historical Relations with Manchus and Chinese and Present Political Problems* (New York: John Day, 1934), 37–87.

6. Robert H. G. Lee, *The Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 20–21.

7. I am, of course, aware that a substantial body of recent scholarship has stressed the distinctly Manchu nature of Qing rule. Most notably, one could cite Pamela Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990) and her even more impressive *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001); and Evelyn C. Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). The debate on just how Manchu or Sinified the Qing dynasty became is well represented in Rawski's "Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History," *Journal of Asian Studies* 55, no. 4 (November 1996): 829–50, and the response by Ho Ping-ti, "In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski's 'Reenvisioning the Qing,'" *Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 1 (February 1998): 123–55.

8. Crossley, *Translucent Mirror*, 10–11, 296–336.

9. Fletcher, "Ch'ing Central Asia"; Lee, *The Manchurian Frontier*, 59–66; Nicola Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia," *International History Review* 20, no. 2 (June 1998): 287–309. *Beg* derives from a Turkic word, later pronounced "bey," meaning prince or governor. Under the Qing, *begs* were appointed officials divided into several ranks.

10. Dorothea Jeuschert, "Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the Mongols," *International History Review* 20, no. 2 (June 1998): 310–24; James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 122; Fletcher, "Ch'ing Central Asia," 77.

11. Ning Chia, "The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644–1795)," *Late Imperial China* 14, no. 1 (1993): 60–92. The conventional translation

of *Lifanyuan* is Court of Colonial Affairs, but the Chinese term *fan* does not imply "colonies" in the usual sense of people transplanted from the motherland, but rather frontier dependencies or subordinated polities in a feudal system.

12. David M. Farquhar, "Emperor as Boddhisattva in the Governance of the Ch'ing Empire," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 38, no. 1 (June 1978): 5–34; Joanna Waley-Cohen, "Religion, War, and Empire-Building in Eighteenth-Century China," *International History Review* 20, no. 1 (June 1998): 336–35; Rawski, *The Last Emperors*, 244–63.

13. Zhang Dengji, "'Zhongguo' gainian de neihan yu liubian xiaokao" (A short study of the meanings and evolution of the term *Zhongguo*), *Zhongguo dalu yanjiu jiaoxue tongxun* 53 (November 2002): 17–20; Wang Ermin, "Zhongguo mingcheng shuyuan jiqi jindai quanshi" (On the origins of the term *Zhongguo* and its modern Chinese explication), in *Zhongguo jindai sixiang shilun* (Studies on modern Chinese thought), ed. Wang Ermin (Taibei, Taiwan: Huashi chubanshe, 1977), 441–80.

14. Gang Zhao, "Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Formation of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century," in *Modern China*, forthcoming 2006. This impressive article is more convincing in documenting Qing imperial attempts to redefine the meaning of *Zhongguo* than in demonstrating that Chinese scholars before the twentieth century accepted the application of the term to the entire Qing Empire.

15. Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 38–43.

16. Wei Yuan, *Shengwuji* (Military history of the Qing dynasty) (Taibei reprint, n.d., original preface, 1842), 3:1a–2a (185–87).

17. The best survey of contemporary Tibetan history is Tsering Shakya, *The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947* (New York: Columbia, 1999); for the American popular imaginary, see Orville Schell, *Virtual Tibet: Search for Shangri-la from the Himalayas to Hollywood* (New York: Henry Holt, 2000).

18. Joseph W. Esherick, *Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Ernest P. Young, *The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977).

19. Lanxin Xiang, *The Origins of the Boxer War: A Multinational Study* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

20. Edward J. M. Rhoads, *Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 71–75; Kauko Laitinen, *Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty: Zhang Binglin as an Anti-Manchu Propagandist* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1990), 47.

21. Douglas R. Reynolds, *The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1993).

22. See Joseph R. Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959); Chang Hao, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890–1907* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

23. Henrietta Harrison, *Inventing the Nation: China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 102–104.

24. See Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 107–25.

25. Liang Qichao, "Guojia sixiang bianqian yitong lun" (Distinctions in the change in thinking about the state), *Yinbingshi heji, wenji* (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1941), vol. 6, p. 20.

26. Liang Qichao, "Zhongguo shi xulun" (Outline of Chinese history), *Yinbingshi heji*, 6:3.

27. Liang Qichao, "Lishi shang Zhongguo minzu zhi guancha" (An examination of the Chinese nation in history) (1906), *Liang Qichao quanji*, vol. 6 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe: 1999): 3419.

28. It is notable that progressive Manchus of the late Qing made exactly the same argument. See Wuzesheng [pseud.], "Man-Han wenti" (The Manchu-Han problem), in *Datong bao* (Tokyo), No. 1 (1907.6.25) (Taibei reprint ed.): 61–67.

29. Liang Qichao, "Lishi shang Zhongguo minzu zhi yanjiu" (A study of the Chinese nation in history) (1922), *Liang Qichao quanji*, vol. 6 (Beijing chubanshe: 1999): 3435–51, quotes from 3435.

30. Laitinen, *Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty*, 12–14, 94–95; James Reeve Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Council on East Asian Studies, 1983), chaps. 2–3.

31. Sun Zhongshan [Sun Yat-sen], speech of June 25, 1911, *Sun Zhongshan quanji* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 1:523; see also Wang Jingwei cited in Laitenen, *Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty*, 113.

32. Zou Rong, "The Revolutionary Army," *Xinhai geming* (1911 Revolution; hereafter: XHGM), ed. Zhongguo shixue hui (Chinese Historical Association) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1957), 1: 331–64 (quotes from 335, 336, 354–55). For an English translation of this work, see Tsou Jung, *The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903*, trans. John Lust (The Hague, The Netherlands: Mouton, 1968).

33. The best English-language study of Zhang Binglin is Laitinen's *Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty*.

34. Zhang Binglin, "Zhonghua minguo jie" (Explaining the Republic of China), in *Zhang Taiyan quaji* (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe,1985), 4:252–62.

35. Zhang Yong, "Cong 'shiba xing qi' dao 'wuse qi'—Xinhai geming shiqi cong Hanzu guojia dao wuzu gonghe guojia de jianguo moshi zhuanbian" (From the eighteen-star flag to the five-color flag: The change in the form of the state from a Han national state to a republic of the five races in the 1911 Revolution period), *Beijing daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban)* 39, no. 2 (March 2000): 109; the revolutionary proclamations are in Zhongguo shixuehui ed., *Xinhai geming* (1911 Revolution) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1957), 5:136–52.

36. *Minlibao* (hereafter MLB), 25 October 1911 (cited in Harrison, *Inventing the Nation*, 133).

37. Rhoads, *Manchus & Han*, 187–204.

38. Jeuschert, "Legal Pluralism," 311–17.

39. Christopher M. Isett, "Village Regulation of Property and the Social Basis for the Transformation of Qing Manchuria," *Late Imperial China* 25, no. 1 (June 2004): 124–86.

40. Lattimore, *Mongols of Manchuria*, 290–91; Lee, *The Manchurian Frontier*, 73.

41. Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 124–52, 251.

42. Peter C. Perdue, "Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Eurasia," *International History Review* 20, no. 2 (June 1998): 263–86.

43. Kwang-ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, "The Military Challenge: The Northwest and the Coast," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 11: *The Late Ch'ing, Part 2*, ed. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 235–43.

44. J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6 (1941): 135–246; John King Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

45. John Gilbert Reid, *The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908–1912: An Episode in Pre-War Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935), 2–16, 124–33; Melvyn C. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 45–46.

46. Reid, *The Manchu Abdication*, 11; Lee, *The Manchurian Frontier*, 138–79.

47. Nakami Tatsuo, "A Protest against the Concept of the 'Middle Kingdom': The Mongols and the 1911 Revolution," in *The 1911 Revolution in China: Interpretive Essays*, ed. Etô Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984), 131, 134–35; Wang Qinyu, *Menggu wenti* (The Mongol Problem) (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1931), 31–33.

48. H. G. C. Perry-Ayscough and R. B. Otter-Barry, *With the Russians in Mongolia* (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1914).

49. Urgynge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims Its Independence in 1911* (Leiden, The Netherlands: H. J. Brill, 1989), 4–5; Zhang Qixiong, *Wai-Meng zhuquan guishu jiaoshe, 1911–1916* (Disputes and Negotiations over Outer Mongolia's National Identity, Unification or Independence and Sovereignty, 1911–1916: An Observation Based on the Principle of the Chinese World Order) (Taibei, Taiwan: Academia Sinica, 1995), 22–23.

50. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet*, 45–58; Dahpon Ho, "The Men Who Would Not Be Amban, and the One Who Would: Four Frontline Officials and a Runaway Qing Tibet Policy, 1905–1911," in *Modern China*, forthcoming.

51. Petition of Jebtsundamba Khutughtu and three others, 29 July 1911, cited in Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 9–10. See also discussion in Nakami, "A Protest."

52. See Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet*; Dahpon Ho, "The Men Who Would Not Be Amban." Given the completeness of Goldstein's and Ho's treatments, and the fact that in the early Republic most of the Chinese discussion was on Mongolia, the remainder of this chapter will follow the Chinese sources and focus on Mongolia.

53. Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 40; see also Perry-Ayscough and Otter-Barry, *With the Russians in Mongolia*, 42.

54. Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 62.

55. "Mengren hebi huaiyi" (Why are the Mongols suspicious?), MLB, 13 December 1911, 4. Wu Tingfang, the revolutionaries' representative in negotiations with the Qing

authorities, responded to a cable from several Mongol princes denying rumors that his party's program was a "narrow nationalism." (Guo Xiaocheng, "Menggu duli ji" [An account of Mongolia's independence], XHGM 7:291.)

56. Proclamation of Mongol parliament, January 17, 1912, XHGM, 7:306–7.

57. Rustow, *A World of Nations*, 22, cited in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, "In Search of a Theory of National Identity," in *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), 8.

58. Cited in Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 144.

59. Zhang Yong, "Cong 'shiba xing qi'", 110–11.

60. The author of the article (cited in the following note) also called the China Proper policy the "Lesser China principle" (*Xiao Zhongguo zhuyi*), but it is unlikely that the advocates of this view would have used such a term.

61. "Zhonghua minguo zhiding xin xianfa zhi xianjue wenti" (Problems that must be solved before deciding on a new constitution for the Republic of China), MLB, 27 January 1912, 1. This long essay is continued on 4 and 7 February 1912, 2.

62. *The Celestial Empire* (Shanghai), 23 November 1912, 288.

63. *Shenbao*, editorials of 2, 5, and 8 October 1912. The Japanese advocate of this position was Fukumoto Sei.

64. *The Celestial Empire* (Shanghai), 23 November 1912, 288.

65. MLB, 18 November 1912; *Shenbao*, 14 February 1913; *Shibao*, 14 September 1912.

66. "Linshi Dazongtong xuanyan shu" (Proclamation of the provisional president), *Sun Zhongshan quanji* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 2:2.

67. Abdication edict of 12 February 1912, in Zhongguo dier lishi dang'an guan, ed. *Zhonghua minguo shi dang'an ziliao huibian* (Nanjing, China: Jiangsu People's Press, 1979), 217–18.

68. Harrison, *Inventing the Nation*, 133–35.

69. Founders of the Republican Unity Association included Wu Tingfang, Zhang Jian, Chen Qimei, and Wang Jingwei (MLB, 21 and 23 December, 1911); the Republic of China Great Harmony Association included a number of Manchus and Mongols along with the Hunan governor Tan Yankai (MLB, 19 March 1912, 12); the Society for the Progress of Citizens of the Five Races included the revolutionary leader Huang Xing, Vice President Li Yuanhong, and leading figures of the Beijing government: Liang Shiyi, Duan Qirui, Cai Yuanpei. On ethnic-geneological versus civic-territorial definitions of nations, see Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

70. "Minguo qingzhu wen" (In celebration of the Republic), MLB, 7 November 1911, 1.

71. MLB, 20 November 1911, 3.

72. "Ning-Hang liangcheng zhi qiren kan" (Bannermen of Nanjing and Hangzhou: Look!), MLB, 29 October 1911, 1. The same "equal benevolence" phrase is used in MLB, 8 November 1911, 1.

73. Zhou Zhengchao, *Meng-shi jilue* (An account of Mongol affairs) (n.p.: 1913), 3a–b, 15–16.

74. On Mongol honors, titles, and stipends under the republic, see Zhuo Hongmou, *Menggu jian* (Mongol reference) (Beijing: self-published, 1919), chap. 9, pp. 44–80; Guo Xiaocheng, "Menggu duli ji," 291; Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 60–61; XHGM, 300–302; "Menggu weilai zhi xingzheng" (The future administration of Mongolia), MLB, 7 April 1912, 7; "Lun youdai Menggu tiaojian" (On the conditions for privileged treatment of the Mongols), MLB, 20 June 1912, 2; *Dongfang zazhi* 17, no. 17 (5 August 1920): 134; and 17, no. 18 (31 August 1920): 145; and also the essay by Uradyn Bulag in this volume.

75. For examples, see "Menggu wenti" (The Mongol Problem), MLB editorial, 14 January 1912, 1.

76. Telegram from Gu Baoheng in Ulan Batur, 20 December 1911, XHGM 7: 296–97; MLB, 22 November 1912, 6–7 on punishing the "demon monks."

77. "Lianhe Han-Man-Meng-Hui-Zang zuzhi mindang yijianshu" (Memorandum on uniting the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Muslims and Tibetans in a People's Party), MLB, 21 and 22 March 1911, 1 (quote from 22 March issue). For similar sentiments, see "Lun wai-Meng zhi weiji riji" (The Outer Mongolian crisis worsens day by day), MLB, 14 April 1912; "Gonghe tongyi hui yijianshu" (Memorandum on the Republican Unity Party), MLB, 21 and 23 December 1911; also MLB, 10 June 1912, 2.

78. See "Menggu wenti," MLB, 14 January 1912, 1; and "Wuhu! Sanbainian xiongfan" (Alas! The brave fence of 300 years), MLB, 6 November 1910, 3. Officials of the new republic even spoke to the Mongols' independent regime in the same terms, affirming the established relationship in which the Tibetans and Mongols "follow their traditional lifestyle and shield the western and northern regions." (Telegram from the department of Mongolian Affairs, early 1912, cited in Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 60). For Qing examples, see Zhang Yuxin, *Qingdai qianqi geminzu tongyi guannian de lishi tezheng* (The historical characteristics of early Qing concepts of unity of the various peoples), *Qingshi yanjiu* 1996, 2:36.

79. This discussion is inspired by Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), chap. 1.

80. Telegram of 12 March 1912, in Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 61–62.

81. Telegram from Yuan Shikai to the Bogd, in Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 62–63.

82. The magazine *Xibei zazhi* (The Northwest), founded in November 1912 to promote the development of the northern and western frontiers, is typical. See also *Choubian zouyan* (Proposals on border affairs) (n.p. [Beijing?], n.d. [early 1910s]); *Renzi bianshi guanjian* (My humble opinions on border affairs, 1913) (Beijing: 1913); Jin Nan, *Mengshi yiban* (A general account of Mongol affairs) (n.p. [Beijing?]: n.d. [1910s]).

83. Zhou Zhengchao, *Meng-shi jilue*, 12–13.

84. Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 41–77; Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet*, 53–88. The parallelism in the strategies of Mongolia and Tibet was hardly accidental. Not only were the two areas linked by a common religion, but the Dalai Lama had fled to Mongolia in 1904, and the two new regimes offered each other

mutual recognition on 1912 (Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 112–13).

85. Yinchang to German minister in Beijing, reported in dispatch of 30 March 1911, in Reid, *The Manchu Abdication*, 216. See also "Wei Gang" (pseud.), *E-Meng jiaoshe shimo* (Full account of the negotiations with Russia and Mongolia) [1912], in Zuo Shunsheng, *Zhongguo jinbainian shi ziliao chupian* (Historical materials on the last one hundred years of Chinese history), vol. 1 (Taipei, Taiwan: Taiwan Zhonghua shuju, 1966), 583–90.

86. As one reads pro-Mongol accounts of the independence movement, one is struck by the close communication between Mongols and both official Russian representatives and Russian Mongolists who served as advisers and intermediaries in Russian-Mongol affairs (Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, esp. 79–107).

87. Nakami, "A Protest,"141–42.

88. Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 46–50.

89. Wei Gang, passim; MLB, November–December 1912, passim.

90. MLB, 22 November 1912, 2.

91. Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 19–21, 42–53; Nakami, "A Protest,"143.

92. Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 22. (The figure is for the Jirim League.)

93. MLB, 1 December 1912.

94. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet*, 65–75. For an overview of the borders of Tibet, as defined by the various parties over time, see Shakya, *The Dragon in the Land of Snows*, xiii–xv.

95. See the "Ministry of Education Approved" *Man-Meng-Xin-Zang shulue* (Account of Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet) by Jin Zhonglin (Kaifeng, Rugushan fang, 1909); Gang Zhao, "Reinventing China."

96. *The Celestial Empire*, 7 September 1912, 367; 21 September 1912, 446; 28 September 1912, Supplement, 58.

97. This was the consistent policy from the first days of the revolution. See Esherick, *Reform and Revolution*, 190.

98. Philander Knox, 3 February 1912, cited in Reid, *The Manchu Abdication*, 290.

99. Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, 58, 68–71; Nakami, "A Protest," 144–46; Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet*, 68–75.